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Trade Gains and Welfare Costs of Income
Stabilization Programs for Hog Producers
in Quebec
H. Garth Coffin and John C. Henning
The welfare costs of deficiency payments for an exported commodity may, under
certain conditions, outweigh the gains from trade. The potential welfare impacts of
stabilization programs in the hog sector in Quebec are estimated, based on a partial
equilibrium framework, and elasticity estimates drawn from other sources. The results
indicate that the loss in surplus in Quebec as a result of deficiency payments is very
modest at approximate] y $8.5 million or 1.7% of the value of production. Meanwhile,
the net gains from trade remain on the order of $14 million.
In this paper, the analytical framework de-
scribed by Schmitz and Chambers was applied
to evaluate the potential welfare effects flow-
ing from the current stabilization programs
supporting the hog sector in Quebec. The
analysis focuses on the domestic impacts of
these programs since, as indicated by Schmitz
and Chambers, whether or not there are sig-
nificant international implications associated
with the use of support programs, there may
be important domestic welfare costs of which
policy makers should be aware.
Introduction
Price and income stabilization programs for
farmers often contain a significant level of sub-
sidization, and the consequent effects of these
agricultural subsidies have been drawing in-
creased attention, particularly in the context
of trade relations. The focus of investigation is
usually on the impact on the importing coun-
try and when injury is found, it may lead to
retaliatory actions such as countervailing
duties.
Recent examples of such actions in agricul-
tural trade between Canada and the United
States include the U.S. countervailing duty on
imports of Canadian hogs (1985) and the Cana-
dian duty on imports of U.S. corn (1986). In
both cases, deficiency payments to producers
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figured prominently as the primary form of
subsidization. With regard to hogs, the U.S.
Department of Commerce determined that the
injury to U.S. pork producers from subsidized
production in Canada warranted a countervai-
ling duty of 4.39 cents (Canadian) per pound
for live hogs.’
The precise effects of Canadian stabilization
programs in the hog sector have been the sub-
ject of ongoing dispute. In the case of Canada-
U.S. trade in hogs, Gilmour and Cluff argued
that the determination of injury was based on
incorrect analysis and demonstrated that the
impact of Canadian stabilization programs
was likely much less than estimated by the
U.S. Department of Commerce (Grimes).
Analysis by Martin and Goddard supports the
contention that stabilization programs have
had little influence on production levels, and
therefore, on Canadian exports of hogs and
pork to the U.S. This conclusion is also sup-
ported by Churches who could not find empir-
ical evidence linking stabilization programs
and regional hog supply in Canada.
Similarly, Rowsell and Kenyon found that
Canadian hog production was affected more
by the administration of supply management
programs in dairy and poultry and that in-
creased exports to the U.S. have been mostly
due to favorable exchange rates. However, it
i U.S. Department of Commerce “Final Affirmative Counter-
vailing Duty Determination: Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Pork Products From Canada. ” Internal Trade Administra-
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may be a mistake to place too much emphasis
on the role of exchange rates. Both Chadee
and Coleman and Meilke have suggested that
the exchange rate effect was relatively minor,
since the effects of the devaluation of feed
prices was proportionately greater than on hog
or pork prices, thus attenuating the exchange
rate impacts on production and exports.
Besides the question of injury to the import-
ing country, another aspect to be considered
in the analysis of the impact of these programs
is the welfare gains and losses within the coun-
try or region of origin when the commodity in
question is exported. Assuming there is some
effect on production, the impacts on exports
could nevertheless be minor relative to the
domestic impacts. Schmitz and Chambers
demonstrated that the welfare costs flowing
from the introduction of a deficiency payment
for an exported commodity, under certain
conditions, can outweigh the gains from trade
in that commodity. When there is a large dif-
ference between a support price and the mar-
ket price in the presence of elastic domestic
supply, a country with an open economy
could be better off by abandoning trade in that
commodity.
This result is particularly relevant when the
direct costs of deficiency payment programs
are large, for even though policy makers may
be reluctant to abandon such programs, they
should be aware of their potential welfare and
trade implications, beyond their simple fiscal
consequences.
Pork Production, Trade and Stabilization in
Quebec
Pork production in Quebec has doubled since
the mid-seventies, bringing the Province from
a deficit position to a point where more than
one-third of output is now surplus to pro-
vincial needs (Table 1). Most of this surplus is
exported to the United States and Japan,
representing approximately 5090of total Cana-
dian exports to these markets. The balance of
the surplus (perhaps up to 20%) presumably
flows to other parts of Canada.
Much of the expansion of pork production,
which reached a peak in 1981, occurred prior
to the establishment of provincial stabilization
programs and may therefore be attributed to
market forces such as low feed costs relative
to pork prices, low real interest rates, and high
unemployment (low opportunity cost for
labour). As previously noted (Rowsell and
Kenyon), supply managment policies that re-
stricted the expansion of dairy and poultry
production also contributed.2 Owen identifies
this limitation as possibly the most important
factor. Other contributing factors were the
high degree of vertical integration by feed
companies, interest rate subsidies, and ease of
access to credit through government sources.
However, even before production reached
its peak, market conditions had begun to
change. Rising production costs and declining
prices contributed to a squeeze of producer
incomes, triggering stabilization programs
which had already been established but had
been relatively idle.3
In 1978, the Quebec Government in-
troduced an income stabilization plan for pig-
lets, followed in 1981 by a plan for market
hogs. In both cases, producer participation in
these plans has been voluntary, but requires a
commitment for five years. Moreover, pro-
ducers pay a fee to be eligible for benefits,
with government committed to contribute two
dollars for each dollar contributed by produc-
ers.
Under these plans, deficiency payments are
made to participating producers when annual
average market prices fall below estimated
production costs, based on a representative
farm production model. The history of pro-
ducer participation, contributions and com-
pensation under these plans is summarized in
Table 2.
The program is designed to have no pre-
announced target price as such, so as produc-
tion decisions are being made, producers are
uncertain whether there will be a payment. Al-
though they might be able to form a reason-
able conjecture of the effective floor price that
the program provides, any payments under
these programs are made in the year following
the period in which the majority of piglets or
hogs are marketed.
The same principle applies to the federal
stabilization program under the Agricultural
Stabilization Act, through which payments are
triggered when average current market prices
‘ Indeed,the earlyexpansionofporkproductionin Quebec be-
gan shortly after a federal government decision to reduce indus-
trial milk production by cutting quota, This decision was particu-
larly painful for Quebec agriculture where nearly half the total
industrial milk production occurs.
3For example, pork stabilization payments under the amended
Federal Agricultural Stabilization Act occurred only five times
from 1975to 1986, three of which were since 1980.120 October 1989 NJARE
Table 1. Quebec Production, Consumption, Exports and Prices, 1976-85
Estimated Net
Pro- Con- Net Market Stabili- Support Year
Year duction sumption Exports Price zation Price Received























































































1976-80 203.3 172.3 31.0 84.79 2,38 76.97








Data for 1976-83 are from Owen (1984). 1984–85are estimated by inspected slaughter plus net exports of live hogs
times average trimmed carcass weight of 61 kg (135 Ibs.).
Estimates based on average per capita consumption for Canada times Quebec population.
Based on production (a) minus consumption (b).
Market prices are those reported for index 100 hogs at Montreal until 1982and Toronto prices thereafter (since
Montreal series was discontinued) deflated by the consumer price index, 1981 = 100.
Net Stabilization payments are calculated in the following manner:
i) payments net of producer premiums under the Quebec piglet program in $ per piglet, multiplied by 0.5 to reflect
the approximate proportion of production eligible for both Quebec programs (i.e., farrow-to-finish operations),
divided by 1.7 (hundredweight per market hog) to convert to per cwt., plus
ii) net stabilization payment to producers under the Quebec market hog program ($/cwt. ), plus
iii) federal stabilization payments to Quebec producers, not participating in the provincial program, in $ per cwt.
(i.e., total payments divided by hundredweight of pork produced, and the Consumer Price Index (1981 = 100).
All amounts for year t are based on payments made in year t + 1).
Support prices for 1976–78are those calculated under the federal program; from 1979forward, support prices are
calculated as market price in year t plus net stabilization payment in year t (i.e., FY,,! +.I)
Support prices calculated for year received treats stabilization payment as part of the price in the year in which it
was actually received. Hence, in this way, support in year t equals market price in year t plus net stabilization
payment in year (t – 1) in column (e).
fall below 90% of the most recent 5-year mov-
ing price, adjusted for inflation in the cash
costs of production. Although calculations of
support levels and payments (if any) are now
made on a quarterly basis, much of the actual
compensation has been distributed at least a
year after the marketing occurred.
Since 1981, under the federal program,
which now applies only to the domestic por-
tion of total production, Quebec producers
have recieved payments totalling nearly $17
million (70 cents per hog marketed). Produc-
ers are not eligible for the benefits of both the
Provincial and Federal programs.
Given the uncertain nature and delayed pay-
ment feature of these programs, and the fact
that support levels are based on some portion
of production costs or historical price levels, it
might be argued that they are unlikely to un-
duly influence production levels and, by de-
finition, cannot exceed long run equilibrium
prices. However considering the fact that pay-
ments were made, from one program or an-
other in six years of the past seven, their trade
and welfare effects might be questioned on
the basis that these programs have now be-
come part of producer expectations. Market
and estimated support prices since 1976 are
shown in Figure 1.
Methodology
According to the partial equilibrium model de-
veloped by Schmitz and Chambers (1986), the
critical determinants of trade gains and wel-
fare losses resulting from deficiency payments
in an exporting country are the level of sub-Cofjn and Henning Gains and Costs of Income Stabilization Programs 121
Table 2. Income Stabilization Insurance Participation and Payments in Quebec
Compensation Paid
No. of Producer No. of % of Net
Program Producers Contri- Animals Hogs Gross Net Per CWT
and Year Covered bution Insured Marketed ToUdl Total Produced
($ Million) (000 head) (%) ($ Million) ($ cwt.)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Piglet Program
1978-79 246 — — —
79-80 783 0.70 1,190 G 7,773 7573 1.34
80-81 1,498 2.05 2,788 58 7,422 5.372 0.83
81-82 1,491 2.43 2,947 60 2,433
82-83 1,405 2.30 3,035 64 0 (!300) (:.34)
83-84 1,759 2.88 3,500 75 29,254 26.374 4!04
84-85 1,788 4.91 3,626 73 24,986 20.076 2,99
85-86 2,121 8.05 4,149 89 19,044 10,944 1.74
86-87 2,187 10.00 4,250 na o 10.000 na
Market Hbgs
1981-82 817 1.48 1,484 30 11,188 9,704 1.42
82-83 921 2.67 1,780 38 0 (2.670) (0.40)
83-84 1,270 3.17 2,115 45 51,046 47.873 7,33
84-85 1,567 10.82 2,704 54 24,416 13.601 2.02
85-86 1,804 13.32 3,331 71 36,140 22.817 3.62
86-87 1,882 13,68 3,420 na o (13.679) na
Source: Regie Des Assurances Agricoles du Quebec, Annual Reports and Other Documents
(a) This represents producers participating in the program.
(b) Based on premiums ranging from $8 per sow in 1978to $40 per sow in 1986for the piglet program and $1,00 per hog
(1981) to $4 per hog (1986) in the market hog program.
(c) Estimates based on the following calculations:
Piglet Program—Producer contribution divided by premium rate per sow multiplied by assumed annual produc-
tion of 17piglets per sow;
Market Hogs—Producer contributions divided by the premium rate per hog,
(d) Data in column (c) as percentage of total hogs marketed.
(e) Total compensation paid to producers.
(f) Compensation paid (co]. (e)) minus producercontributions (col. (b)).
sidization of the commodity and the price
elasticities of supply and demand in both the
exporting and importing regions. This model is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2-A represents the market in the ex-
porting region (Quebec) and Figure 2-B, the
external market consisting of Quebec’s export
supply function (ESX), and the excess demand
function (EDm) of the importing regions. In
the absence of trade distortions, and ignoring
transfer costs, the equilibrium price is es-
tablished at Pf, with quantity FG traded. At
this point, consumer surplus in the exporting
region is represented by the area AFPf and
producer surplus by the area HGPf. The area
FGI represents the trade surplus, or net gain
from trade, in the sense of a quasi-rent larger
than the consumer loss from engaging in trade,
If a deficiency payment is introduced, such
that the support price Ps is above the free mar-
ket equilibrium price Pf, the domestic supply
curve now becomes SXBQS’.4 There is still
some debate regarding how producers would
actually view this support payment, but if it is
assumed that they can correctly anticipate it
and regard it as establishing a floor price, then
this methodology can be interpreted as es-
tablishing an upper bound on the welfare im-
pacts of such payments, In this case, the
quantity supplied increases from Qs to Qs’,
requiring the price to drop to Po in order to
clear the market, In the international market
(Figure 2-B), this has the effect of transform-
ing the excess supply function to the kinked
curve represented by NMESX, with the seg-
ment below M corresponding to the new, per-
fectly inelastic portion of the domestic supply
curve in the exporting region. Trade expands
to the quantity EC.
‘This presumes that producers know the stabilized price and
regard it as a floor price,122 October 1989
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In looking for gains
of Market and Es-
for Hogs in Quebec,
and losses resulting
from the deficiency payment, first consider
producer surplus in the exporting region. Un-
der the program, producer surplus expands to
the area HBPs. The increase over the original
position corresponds to the area bounded by
FYGBPs. Consumers in the exporting region
also gain; consumer surplus increases to the




purchased by domestic consumers at the re-
duced market price resulting from the de-
ficiency payment program. In this case, the
amount of gain, compared to free trade, is rep-
resented by the area PfFEPo.
Unfortunately, in this case, the expenditure
by the government on the deficiency payment
(area PsBCPO) is greater than the combined
increase in consumer and producer welfare.
Thus, there is a net loss in economic surplus
from the exporting region corresponding to
the area FGBCE. As noted by Schmitz and
Chambers, this net loss is composed of the
loss in trade surplus (FGDE) resulting from a
lower price without reduced costs, and the
efficiency loss (BCD) associated with produc-
ing that portion of output for which marginal
costs exceed marginal revenue.
Schmitz and Chambers also decompose the
total deficiency payment (PsBCPO) into what
they identify as a pure export subsidy (TBCE)
and a domestic consumer subsidy (PsTEPo).
In their construction, this export subsidy ex-
ceeds the domestic subsidy, which they in-
terpret as indicating that economic surplus is
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the surplus transferred is equal to the area
PfKLPo (Figure 2-B) which is not directly re-
lated to the relative sizes of the above subsi-
dies. To illustrate, while keeping the rest of the
figure in its place, imagine shifting the ordinate
in Figure 2-A to the left, so that the size of the
domestic market expands relative to the quan-
tity of product exported. In this way, the size
of the domestic subsidy can be made as large
as desired without affecting the size of the
welfare transfers.
Alternatively, the transferred surplus can be
related to the loss in trade surplus (FGDE)
which is equal in area to the trapezoid PfKTPo
in the importing market, and a remainder
(TLK) which is equal in area to the triangle
GCD which represents part of the domestic
efficiency loss (BCD). The difference in these
last two areas (GCB) represents the actual
deadweight loss resulting from the subsidy.
Schmitz and Chambers (page 39) refer to the
larger area FGBCE as a “deadweight loss”,
but it is GCB that is deadweight in the sense of
a net loss of welfare, taking both trading re-
gions into account.
Thus, although the subsidy increases
domestic consumer and producer surplus,
there is also net loss of economic surplus by
the exporting region, part of which is captured
by the importing region, with the remainder
representing a deadweight welfare loss.
This framework was applied to the income
stabilization insurance programs for pork pro-
duction in Quebec using data drawn from this
sector for the period 1981–85, (Table 1), The
monetary data in this table and the results are
all expressed in constant 1981 dollars. Several
simplifying assumptions are applied to this
analysis. First, although producers participate
in either the provincial or the federal program,
it was assumed that all producers receive the
average payment, net of producer premiums,
for the two programs taken together, (column
e, Table 1). It was also assumed that stabiliza-
tion payments are viewed by producers as part
of the market return, (i.e. a component of
price); finally, rather than attempt to estimate
the supply and demand elasticities, these were
based on other studies with the aim of being as
realistic as possible.
Using these elasticities, supply, demand,
and import demand were derived as linear
functions, using data averaged over the period
1981–85 and again for 1983, a year during
which the subsidy was particularly high. in
Figure 2-A, points B and E are known and
using the assumed elasticities, the demand,
supply and excess supply curves can be gen-
crated.s Point L and the assumed import
demand elasticity are used to generate the
import demand curve.
In order to test the sensitivity of the results
to the elasticities used, various values were
assumed for both the exporting region
(Quebec), and the importing region, repre-
sented by the U.S. The elasticities utilized in
this analysis were based on estimates pro-
vided by previous research. Gilmour and Cluff
utilize estimates of Canadian long run supply
of 0.4 and demand of – 0.85. Given the spe-
cialized and capital intensive nature of hog
production in Quebec, supply is likely to be
somewhat less price elastic than in the major
grain producing areas of North America where
more production alternatives exist. An es-
timate of 0.3 for Quebec was provided by
Agriculture Canada. Other recent estimates
include Churches (0,2, short run for Quebec),
and Coleman and Meilke (O.10, 0.28) (short
run, long run, for eastern Canada). Martin and
Goddard estimated price flexibilities of the
U.S, price with respect to Canadian exports
that suggest import demand elasticities rang-
ing from –3.3 to –8.3.
Results
According to the results in Table 3, (all ex-
pressed in constant $1981) it is evident from
this simple analysis that the welfare costs
associated with these stabilization programs
are not very large, especially when placed in
the context of the value of production or ex-
ports. The maximum calculated loss of surplus
to Quebec (BCD + FGDE) as a result of the
deficiency payments was approximately $8.5
million, for the year 1983. By comparison,
production had a value on the order of $500
million and exports about one third of this
amount. This means that the maximum loss of
surplus to Quebec would represent about
1.7% of the value of production or about 5% of
the value of exports. Meanwhile the net gains
from trade (EDI-BCD) are still positive and
are on the order of at least $14 million.
The results are sensitive to changes in the
‘ For example,using the 1981-85 averages, point B represents
production of 300 thousand tonnes at a support price of $67.94 per
cwt. point E corresponds to consumption of 186.2 thousand
tonnes at the market price of $63.17/cwt, and point L corresponds
to 113.7 thousand tonnes of exports at the same market price.124 October 1989 NJARE
Table 3. Welfare and Trade Implications of Hog Stabilization in Quebec
Remaining
Production Gross Net Lost Dead-
Us Quebec Subsidy Trade Trade Trade
1report supply cost
weight
Gain Gains Surplus Loss
Year Elast. EIast. (BCD) (EDI) (EDI-BCD) (FGDE) (GBC)
1981-85 $(1981) Million Canadian
(average) 3.3 0.3 0,464 30.304 29.840 1.753 0.404
8.3 0.3 0.464 30.304 29.840 0.919 0.432
3.3 0.4 0.619 26.138 ~5.519 2.202 0.516
8.3 0.4 0.619 26,138 ~5,5[9 1.174 0.563
1983
3.3 0.3 2.982 22.301 19.319 3,697 2.635
8.3 0.3 2.982 22.301 19.319 1.917 2.799
3.3 0.4 3.976 17.795 13.819 4,522 3.382
8.3 0.4 3.976 17.795 13.819 2.363 3.657
elasticities assumed and the general direction
of effects is indicated by Figures 3 through 5.
Like the results of Schmitz and Chambersj as
the Quebec elasticity of supply increases, so
does the net loss of surplus (BCD + FGDE),
and the deadweight loss (GBC) in the export-
ing region. This is indicated by the results in
Table 3, but is further illustrated in Figure 3
which shows the response of these two mea-
sures to changes in the domestic supply
elasticity, over the range of 0.1 to 3.0, for the
two alternate import demand elasticities used
in Table 3.
Increasing the elasticity of supply also re-
sults in a decrease in the net gain from engag-
ing in trade. Over the range of supply elastici-
ties for Quebec which could be considered
plausible, (perhaps 0.1 to 1.5) the net gains
,0 ——
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Figure 3. Sensitivity of Deadweight and Sur-
plus Losses to Assumed Domestic Supply and
Import Demand Elasticities
from trade decay by about 90%. Although the
net gain from trade is shown to be sensitive to
the elasticity of supply, from the policy point
of view a result that is perhaps more interest-
ing is that the net gain from trade falls to zero
at the point that the Quebec supply elasticity
reaches 2.1, as shown in Figure 4,6 This point
is independent of the assumed elasticity of im-
port demand, but it is influenced by the
domestic elasticity of demand. As domestic
demand becomes more elastic, the point at
which net gains from trade reaches zero de-
clines but the relationship is not dramatic.
The data in Table 3 also indicate that as the
import demand elasticity increases, the net
loss of economic surplus (FGBCE) in Quebec
decreases, but the deadweight loss increases.
5 This is based on 1981–85 average marketdata with the import
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Figure 5. Welfare Transfers and Deadweight
Losses
In order to give a greater appreciation of the
sensitivity of these results to the chosen im-
port demand elasticity, these measures, and
the transfer of trade surplus (FGDE) were
calculated over a range of import elasticities
and are reported in Figure 5. As is evident
from the figure, both the trade surplus transfer
and the loss of surplus fall off quite rapidly as
the import demand elasticity increases, but
the deadweight loss is not greatly affected.
Conclusions
It has been argued that the domestic im-
plications, in terms of trade gains and welfare
and efficiency losses, from the subsidization
of an exported commodity might, under some
circumstances, be as important as the interna-
tional price effects. This does not appear to be
the situation in the case of hog stabilization in
Quebec. By making use of the assumption that
producers view the stabilization programs as
establishing a price floor, this analysis pro-
vides estimates of the upper bounds of the
welfare losses in the Quebec hog sector due to
this form of subsidy.
When considering the loss of economic sur-
plus from the use of such programs as com-
pared to free trade, although the loss is sensi-
tive to both the elasticities of domestic supply
and import demand, the loss is relatively small
over the plausible ranges which might be en-
visaged for these two parameters, Likewise,
the remaining net gains from engaging in trade
are quite sensitive to the domestic elasticity of
supply, However, the elasticity of supply
would have to reach 2.1 before the benefits of
trade would be erased. Thus, under present
conditions, policy makers can be fairly certain
that although there is a theoretical welfare
cost to the use of deficiency payments in this
sector, it is not substantial enough to offset the
theoretical benefits of trade.
Similarly, unless the conditions of highly
elastic export supply and import demand are
met in other cases, the prospect of welfare
losses through trade may not be a strong in-
centive for countries to reduce the level of
stabilization.
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